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Abstract 
In a seminal paper, Gibbons and Katz (1991) develop and empirically test an asymmetric 
information model of the labor market. The model predicts that wage losses following displacement 
should be larger for layoffs than for plant closings, which was borne out by data from the Displaced 
Workers Survey (DWS). In this paper, we take advantage of many more years of DWS data to examine 
how the difference in wage losses across plant closings and layoffs varies with race and gender. We find 
that the differences between white males and the other groups are striking and complex. The “lemons 
effect” of layoffs holds for white males, as in the Gibbons-Katz model, but not for the other three 
demographic groups (white females, black females, and black males). These three all experience a greater 
decline in earnings at plant closings than at layoffs. This results from two reinforcing effects. First, plant 
closings have substantially more negative effects on minorities than on whites. Second, layoffs seem to 
have more negative consequences for white men than the other groups. These findings suggest that the 
Gibbons-Katz asymmetric information model is not sufficient to explain all of the data. We augment the 
model with heterogeneous human capital and show that this model can explain the findings. We also 
provide some additional evidence suggestive that both asymmetric information and heterogeneous human 
capital are important. In support of both explanations, we demonstrate that the racial and gender effects 
are surprisingly robust to region, industry, and occupation controls. To look at the asymmetric 
information, we make use of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which induced employers to lay off 
“protected” workers in mass layoffs rather than fire them for cause. As a result, relative to whites, a layoff 
would be a more negative signal for blacks after 1991 than before. If information is important, this would 
in turn imply that blacks experience a relatively larger loss in earnings at layoffs after 1991 than prior; 
and that’s what we find in the data. In addition, as further evidence for heterogeneous human capital, we 
document for the first time in the literature that the two types of layoffs reported in the DWS data, namely 
layoffs due to “slack work” and “position abolished,” have very different features when compared to plant 
closings. Finally, we simulate our model and show that it can match the data. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The role of asymmetric information in labor market outcomes has long been of interest to 
labor economists (e.g., Akerlof 1976; Spence 1973; Greenwald 1986; and Laing 1994). 
Empirical studies on this topic, however, have been scarce. In a seminal paper, Gibbons and Katz 
(1991; hereafter GK) construct a model of asymmetric information in the labor market. They use 
their model to argue that if firms have discretion as to which workers to lay off, a layoff provides 
a signal to the outside market that a worker is of low quality. By contrast, virtually all workers 
lose their jobs when their plant closes, so job loss from a plant closing does not provide a 
negative signal. Gibbons and Katz test for asymmetric information by looking at changes in 
wages for white-collar workers.1  Since a layoff provides a negative signal about ability, one 
would expect wages to fall more following a layoff than for a plant closing. Gibbons and Katz 
confirm this prediction in the data, showing that wage penalties are substantially higher for 
layoffs than for plant closings. 
In this paper, we take advantage of the fact that we have many more years of displaced 
worker data to expand on GK by looking at how the difference in wage losses across plant 
closings and layoffs varies with race and gender. Statistical discrimination against African 
Americans or women occurs when employers use race and gender as a predictor for 
productivity.2  If this is the case, then one would expect the information contained in a layoff to 
vary across racial and gender groups. Empirically, we find that the differences between white 
males and the other groups are striking and complex. We find that the basic prediction by GK 
actually fails for three of our four demographic groups (white females, black females, and black 
males), as workers actually experience a greater decline in earnings at plant closings than at 
layoffs. This results from two reinforcing effects. First, plant closings have substantially more 
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negative effects on minorities than on whites. Second, layoffs seem to have more negative 
consequences for white men than for the other groups. 
Does this mean that one should discard the GK model? We think clearly not. However, 
the simple model is not sufficient to explain all of the data, so we augment it. We propose a new 
model that extends the asymmetric information model of GK by including heterogeneous human 
capital.3 In our model, different types of firms hire different types of workers. Once a worker has 
worked for a firm for a period, the current firm knows his/her skill level, but outside firms do 
not. We model layoffs and plant closings as arising when shocks hit firms. Severe shocks lead 
the firms to cease operation (plant closings), while less severe shocks lead them to reduce the 
size of their workforces (layoffs). On the one hand, a plant closing may be more devastating than 
a layoff because it may be associated with a larger negative shock to the human capital of a 
particular worker. On the other hand, layoffs send a bad signal to the market and thus have 
additional negative consequences on the worker. If a layoff is a substantially stronger signal for 
white males than for the other groups, this could lead the information hit for a layoff to dominate 
for white males while the human capital aspect dominates for the other groups. 
We provide some additional evidence that suggests that both asymmetric information and 
heterogeneous human capital are important. In support of both explanations we demonstrate that 
the racial and gender effects are surprisingly robust to inclusion of region, industry, and 
occupation dummies. We argue that this would seem unlikely if the explanation were simply that 
there is variation in the type of jobs performed by different demographic groups. To look at 
asymmetric information, we make use of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which induced employers 
to lay off “protected” workers in mass layoffs rather than fire them for cause. As a result, a layoff 
should become a relatively more negative signal for blacks after 1991 than prior. Thus, if 
 3
asymmetric information is important, one would expect the relative wage losses of blacks 
following layoffs to increase after 1991, which is precisely what we find. 
As further evidence of the importance of human capital heterogeneity, we distinguish 
between two types of layoffs. In the displaced worker survey, an individual can become laid off 
either because of “position abolished” or “slack work.” In the spirit of our model, a “slack work” 
layoff can be thought of as arising from a shock to one’s firm type (i.e., something like an 
industry-specific shock). By contrast, a “position abolished” layoff can be thought of as arising 
from a human capital type specific shock (i.e., something like an occupation-specific shock). An 
individual can avoid the first order effect of the former type of shock by switching sectors, but 
they can not avoid the first order effect of the latter type shock. Thus, if they are of similar 
magnitude, we would expect a substantially larger fall in earnings from the second type of shock 
than for the first, and that is precisely what we see in the data. Earnings falls are greater when 
layoff is associated with “position abolished” than when it is associated with “slack work.” 
Furthermore, we find that wage losses from plant closings fall in between these two types of 
layoffs in terms of their magnitude, which is in contrast to GK prediction. The findings from 
distinguishing between different types of layoffs are, to the best of our knowledge, new to the 
literature on displacement, and we think they are interesting in their own right. 
Due to the small sample size, we do not formally try to reconcile the stronger negative 
consequences of plant closing for minority groups. However, we postulate that it could be 
explained if some firms discriminate against minorities more than others, as in the taste 
discrimination model of Becker (1971). Minority workers are likely to match with 
nondiscriminatory firms. As a result, plant closings are likely to have strong negative impacts on 
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these workers. By contrast, if some firms are discriminatory, then minorities who experience 
layoffs may be more likely to be laid off by a discriminatory firm. 
Finally, we simulate our model and show that it can match the data. Due to sample size 
(and precision) considerations, we focus on the differences across gender. We show in our model 
that if a layoff is a substantially stronger signal for men than for women, this could lead the 
information hit for a layoff to dominate for men while the human capital aspect dominates for 
women. This allows us to reconcile the result. While we can not formally prove that one needs 
asymmetric information and heterogeneous human capital to match the moments, we think our 
model provides the most plausible story. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Empir-
ical results are reported in Section 3. We present the model in Section 4 and then simulate it in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
2  DATA 
We use data from the biennial Displaced Workers Surveys (DWS) Supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1984 and 2002. The DWS were conducted as part of 
the January CPSs in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 2002, and the February CPSs in 1994, 
1996, 1998, and 2000. Each of the supplements from 1984–1992 asks workers if they lost a job 
at any time in the previous five-year period, and each supplement from 1994–2002 asks this 
question for the previous three-year period.4 Displacement is defined as involuntary separation 
based on operating decisions of the employer such as a plant closing, employer going out of 
business, or a layoff from which the worker was not recalled. Other events, including quits and 
being fired for cause, were not considered displacement. Thus, the supplement is designed to 
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focus on the loss of jobs that results from business decisions of firms unrelated to the 
performance of particular workers. If the response to the job loss question is positive, the 
respondent is then asked about the reason of job loss: 1) plant closing, 2) slack work, 3) position 
or shift abolished, 4) seasonal jobs ended, 5) self-employment failed, and 6) other. The data have 
information on workers’ demographics, tenure on predisplacement job, occupation, industry and 
weekly earnings, weeks of joblessness after displacement, and current weekly earnings.5 
We restrict the sample to workers aged 20–64 who lost a job in the private sector in the 
preceding three-year period due to plant closing, slack work, or position or shift abolished, and 
are reemployed in the private sector at the survey date. We only focus on workers who made 
full-time to full-time job transitions (i.e., lost a full-time job and are reemployed on a full-time 
job).6 We exclude workers who have reemployment weekly real earnings under $40. Earnings 
are deflated by the 1982–1984=100 consumer price index (CPI). As in GK, we distinguish 
between blue- and white-collar workers. The white-collar sample consists of workers with 
predisplacement jobs as managers and administrators, professional and technical workers, 
clerical workers, and sales workers while the blue-collar sample consists of workers with pre-
displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers, transport operatives, or 
service workers. We exclude workers in agriculture and construction industries. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Tables 1A and 1B. We divide the data 
into 16 different groups, classifying by gender, race, blue- or white-collar, and layoff/plant 
closing. Sample means and standard deviations for all of the variables are displayed in the cells. 
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3  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
3.1  Basic Results 
The main focus of our empirical work is on the wage losses associated with plant 
closings and layoffs for various demographic groups. To a large extent our main results can be 
seen from our summary statistics in Table 1A. Note that we have a much longer history of data 
than GK, who only use 1984–1986. Since we can now extend the data until 2002, our sample 
size is large enough to condition on specific demographic groups. The key variable is the change 
in the logarithm of the real wage, which is shown in the third row. First, focusing on white 
males, one can see that the main prediction of the GK model holds up. White men lose 
approximately 6 percent of their wages at plant closings, but this rises to around 10 pecent at 
layoffs. This can be interpreted as evidence that asymmetric information is important.7 However, 
for the other three demographic groups the point estimates actually go in the opposite direction. 
In particular, for African American males and females the contrast is striking, with substantially 
larger wage losses associated with plant closings than with layoffs. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant.8 In Table 1B we present results for blue-collar workers, and like GK, we 
find that wage losses are similar for plant closing as for layoffs. This result holds approximately 
for all four demographic groups. 
A key question is why the relative losses at plant closing and layoffs vary so much across 
the demographic groups in Table 1A. Is it because the losses at plant closing are larger, or is it 
that the losses at layoffs are smaller? To add control variables and formally test for differences, 
we set up the model in a regression framework. The main results for white-collar workers are 
presented in Table 2A. The key dependent variable is the change in log wages (i.e., log of 
postdisplacement wage minus log of predisplacement wage). We regress that variable on black 
 7
and female dummy variables interacted with layoffs and plant closing. Note that this 
specification is not completely free in that we do not interact race with gender so that the gender 
effect is constrained to be the same for the two different races.9 One can see that the results 
described above depend on differences at both layoff and plant closing. In particular, blacks 
experience both smaller wage losses at layoff and larger losses at plant closing than do whites. 
However, the plant closing effect seems to be the larger of the two and the layoff effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
For women the story portrayed in Table 2A is quite different. We see only a small 
difference at plant closing between men and women, but women experience much smaller wage 
declines following a layoff. In our simulation results below we will explore why this might be 
true. 
A particularly striking aspect of the results is the robustness of the results in Table 2A to 
inclusion of control variables. While parameters change some from column (1) to (2), all of the 
relevant coefficients change very little between columns (2), (3), and (4). We view it as 
particularly surprising that occupation, industry, and region controls seem to make little 
difference in the final result. This strongly suggests that the racial and gender patterns we 
document are not simply due to differences in the sector of the economy in which workers were 
employed. 
In Table 2B we present results for blue-collar workers. The interactions are virtually all 
smaller in absolute value than those in Table 2A, and none of the interactions are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
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3.2  Employment Discrimination Legislation 
The GK model assumes that firms maximize profits and rationally decide whom to 
dismiss. It also assumes that the only way for an employer to dismiss low-quality workers is 
through a layoff. In reality, firms can also dismiss workers by firing them for cause. It is 
plausible that firms can fire the lowest quality workers in the initial period, and when facing a 
shock, lay off the next lowest quality workers in a later period. Noneconomic factors, such as 
concerns about discrimination lawsuits, can lead employers to alter their methods of dismissal. 
For example, if workers are more likely to sue for wrongful termination when fired than when 
dismissed as a part of a layoff (see for example, Donohue and Siegelman [1993]), then increases 
in the expected costs to firms should induce substitution toward layoffs and away from 
individual firings (i.e., lowering cutoff in the initial screen for those who are more likely to sue). 
Oyer and Schaefer (2000) test the hypothesis by exploring the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (CRA91), which increases the expected costs to firms of displacing “protected” 
employees (such as blacks and females).10 Using data from the 1987–1993 SIPP, they find that, 
relative to whites, rates of overall involuntary job loss (including both layoff and firing) of black 
men were unaffected by CRA91.11 However, while black men were significantly more likely to 
be fired than white men in the pre-CRA91 period, this difference disappeared in the post-CRA91 
period. Following the logic of the GK model, a layoff (as opposed to a firing) should be a more 
negative signal for black workers after 1991 than before. Since we are examining layoffs rather 
than firings, the GK model and the Oyer and Shaefer (2000) results imply that the lemon effect 
for black workers should be larger after the CRA91 than before. Thus, we would expect wages to 
fall more dramatically at layoffs for blacks relative to whites after 1991 than before.12 
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The DWS data contain information about the year in which workers lost their jobs, by 
which we divide the sample into two subperiods: 1981–1991 and 1992–2001. In Table 3 we 
repeat the specification of Table 2A except that we interact all of the main coefficients with a 
dummy variable for post 1991. The point estimates tell a strong story that conforms with our 
prediction if signaling is important. Relative to whites, the wage hit for blacks associated with a 
layoff is substantially larger after 1991. To put it more literally, prior to 1991 whites had much 
larger wage declines at layoff than blacks, but that difference essentially disappeared after the 
CRA91. Further evidence that this is not just sporadic comes from examining the other 
coefficients. None substantially differ before and after the Civil Rights Act. We take this as 
evidence that asymmetric information plays an important role in the labor market. However, one 
should keep in mind that the confidence interval for the key interaction found in the first row of 
Table 3 is wide. It is significant at the 10 percent level (or 5 percent one-sided level) with a large 
point estimate. At the very least, we find these results highly suggestive that layoff appears to be 
a relatively more negative signal of quality for African American workers after the CRA91. 
 
3.3  Length of Unemployment 
Our results to this point have focused only on wages. However, an obvious selection 
problem arises since we focus only on workers who have been subsequently hired. We are also 
interested in the overall well being of these individuals, which depends not only on the wage 
impact of displacement, but also the length of the subsequent unemployment spell. 
To examine this, we follow GK by using a Weibull proportional hazard model to analyze 
a sample of first spells of joblessness.13 The hazard can be specified as 
1 ′βγ−
γ
Xit e , 
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where Xi is observable covariates, t is duration and (γ, β) are parameters. The nice aspect of the 
Weibull model is that the expected value of the log duration is linear, so that if Ti represents the 











In Table 4 we report estimates of our model using a specification analogous to Table 2. 
We report the results in terms of change in average log duration (−β/γ). For clarity, a positive 
number means that the average unemployment spell would be longer. 
The main results in Table 4 are similar to those found in Table 2. First, one can see that 
for white-collar workers, plant closing is relatively worse than layoff for women and blacks in 
comparison to white males. We also see that for white males, layoff is associated with 
significantly longer unemployment spells than plant closing. The result for blue-collar workers is 
similar although with smaller magnitude. We also again see that plant closing has a much more 
negative impact on African Americans (and women) than on white males. 
Other results are somewhat different than for wage differences in that we find that layoffs 
are associated with longer unemployment spells for women and blacks than for white males. 
However, this should not be viewed as surprising. Our results in Table 2 were on wage 
differences so that we implicitly allow for a fixed effect. The length of unemployment is not 
analogous because there is nothing like a fixed effect. Thus, the comparisons of the level of 
unemployment by race and gender in Table 4 do not contradict the results in Table 2, which 
compare wage differences by race and gender.14 It is straightforward to show in a search model 
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(see, for example Mortensen [1987]) that one would expect workers with higher wage options to 
experience shorter unemployment spells. Thus we do not view this result as at all surprising. 
Another result that does tell a somewhat different story than before is that in Table 2A we 
found that white males are the only group for which layoff is worse than plant closing. In terms 
of unemployment spells, the other three demographic groups seem to look similar to white men 
in the sense that unemployment spells are longer following a layoff. One explanation for this 
result is that workers have advanced warning before a plant closing and may begin the search 
process at an earlier stage so that they are better prepared when it actually happens. 
Overall, we view these results as telling a story similar to those in Table 2. Relative to 
layoffs, plant closings are associated with longer spells of unemployment for blacks and women 
than for white men. Note further that these results suggest that selection bias is not the main 
driving force behind the wage loss results. To see why, consider a simple reservation wage 
model in which workers accept a job when the offered wage exceeds the reservation wage. When 
the reservation wage increases, one would expect the average reemployment wage to go up and 
the length of the unemployment spell to increase. However, this does not seem to be the driving 
force behind our estimates. We find that in cases in which reemployment wages fall, relative 
unemployment spells tend to lengthen. For example, the reemployment wage between layoff and 
plant closing is relatively worse for men than women, and the unemployment spell is relatively 
longer. This suggests that the results are not driven by different behavior in the reservation 
wages, but rather by changes in the demand for workers. In the example the relative demand for 
workers who lost their jobs from a layoff versus plant closing is worse for men than women. 
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3.4  Discussion 
To summarize our basic results, we find that plant closings have substantially more 
negative effects on minorities than on whites. By contrast we find that layoffs seem to have more 
negative consequences for white men than the other groups. For three of our four demographic 
groups (black men, black women, and white women) we find the opposite of the GK prediction; 
plant closings lead to more negative consequences than do layoffs. The question arises as to 
which models can explain these results. 
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that individuals from different demographic groups 
perform different types of jobs and thus have different displacement experiences. We find this 
difficult to reconcile with Table 2A, which shows that these effects are remarkably robust to 
inclusion of industry and occupation controls. 
The strongest evidence in favor of asymmetric information can be found in Table 3. As 
described above, if asymmetric information were important, one would expect the relative wage 
losses of blacks following layoffs to increase after 1991, which is precisely what we find. 
An intriguing aspect of our empirical results is that the negative consequences of plant 
closings are much worse for African American white-collar workers. One explanation for this 
result is that some firms discriminate against minorities more than others (Becker 1971). 
Minority workers should be more likely to match with nondiscriminatory firms. In that case, the 
consequences of these nondiscriminatory plants closings is likely to have strong negative 
consequences for these workers. By contrast, the same argument would not hold for layoffs. If 
discriminatory firms hire minorities, they may be more likely to be lay them off. If this is the 
case, one would not expect to see such an effect in layoffs.15 Formal development of this model 
would be relatively difficult if one wants to avoid the unrealistic prediction of perfect segregation 
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across firms. Incorporating labor market frictions such as search frictions could be used to obtain 
more realistic predictions. For example, one could augment a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) type 
model by allowing firms to have heterogeneity in tastes for workers by race. However, given the 
small sample size of blacks in our sample and the added complication of search frictions (in 
addition to asymmetric information and heterogeneous human capital), we do not address the 
race gap in the model.  Rather, we focus in the rest of the paper on the gender gap. The basic 
result is that the wage loss is similar for men and women at plant closing, but larger for men at 
layoff. In the next few sections we will show that an asymmetric model modified to include 
heterogeneous human capital can reconcile these results. 
 
4  MODEL 
We develop an equilibrium model with asymmetric information and heterogeneous 
worker and firm types. We allow for an infinite number of periods, although only the first few 
periods are of interest. We do this to avoid the results in the model being driven by the fact that 
we are getting close to the terminal period of the model rather than the economic factors that we 
model. 
We have J sectors and L different types of workers. We label the sectors by j for j = {1, 
…, J} and label labor types by ℓ for ℓ = {1; …, L}. Let Htℓsj be the aggregate human capital of 
type ℓ working in sector j in state of the world s at time t and let Htjs = (Ht1js, …, HtLjs) be the 
vector of inputs for a firm. The production function for sector j at time t in state s takes the form 
Gtjs (Htjs) . 
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We assume further that each firm within the sector is large enough so that the law of large 
numbers holds (so that average productivity is all that matters) and that G has constant returns to 
scale.16 
Before providing the details of the model, we begin by describing the timing of the 
model: 
Period 1:  Workers are hired by firms, but the firms have only limited information about worker 
quality. 
 
Period 2  Firms learn about worker quality and only retain workers above a minimum threshold. 
 
Period 3  The economy is hit by a shock that leads firms to either close or lay off workers. These 
workers are then rehired by other firms. 
 
Period 4 and beyond Nothing additional happens as workers continue to work for firms. 
 
Displacement as defined in the DWS occurs not from screening by ability as would occur 
in period 2, but rather by some shock to the firm (plant closing, slack work, or position 
abolished). Thus the focus of this model is on workers who are displaced in period 3. The 
changes in earnings depends on the type of shock that hits the economy, which effects overall 
demand for worker types and how employers infer worker quality from the layoff. 
Both of these are equilibrium phenomena, so it is essential to model the interaction 
between types of firms in the economy. The first piece of the equilibrium concept is that once a 
worker has started working for a firm, the firm has all of the bargaining power and can take all of 
the surplus. Specifically, firms can make “take it or leave it” offers. However, the second piece is 
that the labor market is perfectly competitive. As a result, competition will bid the rent that firms 
make from workers to zero (on average). Thus, firms will tend to make profit on workers beyond 
the first period but will pay for this future profit in terms of higher first period wages. Thus, the 
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outside wage is determined competitively and the current employer will always offer the outside 
wage (that is for workers who are retained). We now present the details of the model. 
In terms of more specifics about the timing, the production function remains the same in 
periods 1 and 2, in which case the index s is degenerate. However, we assume that in period 3 the 
production process is potentially hit by a shock that may or may not affect different sectors. In 
particular, there is a finite set of states of the world s = 1, …, S with μs representing the 




μ =∑S ss  After period 3, Gtjs remain fixed at those values 
forever. Thus, the production function only changes between periods 2 and 3. Abusing notation 
somewhat, we do not explicitly express the state subscript s for periods 1 and 2 across different 
variables in the model. 
We essentially follow a single cohort, so that t represents both time and age, which are 
collinear. We use Yℓ to denote the amount of human capital that an individual of type ℓ possesses. 
A key aspect of the model is asymmetric information. When firms make offers to workers, they 
do not know their productivity. However, after employing the worker for a period, they learn 
their productivity. At that point the firm may choose to fire or layoff workers. Also during the 
first period that a worker works for a firm, his productivity is Yℓ. For the second period and 
beyond, his productivity at that firm is τYℓ where τ > 1. This parameter τ plays an important role 
in the analysis. If τ = 1, no workers would be retained in the equilibrium we examine (unless 
there is an upper bound to the support of productivity that has a positive probability of 
occurring).17 We have modeled τ as if it is specific human capital. Alternatively, we could 
interpret (τ − 1)Yℓ as a training cost (or other type of hiring cost) that results in lower 
productivity during the first period.18 
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At the beginning of each period in which a worker’s productivity is known, each firm can 
decide whether to lay off the workers. Since firms are indifferent between laying off a worker 
and retaining them with a wage that is lower than the market wage, there will be multiple 
equilibria in the model. Gibbons and Katz describe this class of equilibria. We focus only on the 
equilibria in which firms never pay a worker lower than their outside option.19 
Within human capital types, firms strictly prefer higher ability workers so they can 
construct a cutoff value for each type of labor. They then only retain workers whose ability is 
above this cutoff value. For workers in the second period, we write the cutoff as *2 .jy R  In the 
third, the cutoff depends on the shock to the economy s so we will write the cutoff as *3 .jsy R  
In our model, firms dismiss workers at the beginning of period 2 and then again at the 
beginning of period 3. It is important to point out that we view these as distinct phenomena. 
During period 1, firms learn about the quality of a worker. They choose not to retain the worker 
because they have fallen below the screening value of the firm. Thus, in period 2 the event that 
leads to the separation is the firm learning about the quality of the worker. 
The retention decision at the beginning of period 3 is quite different. These workers have 
already made it beyond the initial screen, so the event that leads to workers being laid off is an 
adverse effect to the firm.20 Given the wording of the questions in the DWS, we assume that the 
data correspond to the latter type of dismissal rather than the former. Since they are not of 
primary concern, workers who are below the cutoff value in period 2 leave this part of the 
economy (which may seem reasonable given that we are focusing on the white-collar sector). 
However, since our main goal is to focus on the displaced workers, we allow those who are not 
retained in period 3 to be rehired within this part of the economy. 
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We assume that outside firms know the cutoff levels of other firms in the economy but do 
not know the level of productivity of individual workers. Thus, workers who are above the cutoff 
may be potentially poached by other firms. However, all that the potential poachers know about 
the ability of the worker is that their productivity is higher than the cutoff. Some sectors will not 
fire anyone during the third period, so for notational purposes we denote this by assuming that 
cutoff remains the same ( )* *3 2 .=js jy yR R  
Let fℓj denote the fraction of workers of type ℓ who work in sector j at time 1 and φℓhjs the 
fraction of ℓ-type workers who worked for an h type firm in periods 1 and 2, but were not 
retained by h in period 3 and were hired into sector j in state of the world s. In principle, firms 
can “poach” retained workers from other firms. This will not happen in equilibrium, so to 
economize on notation, we do not explicitly account for it when describing sectorwide human 
capital. However, this potential “poaching” plays a role in the analysis as it determines the 
outside wage. 
During the first period, Yℓ is not revealed so there will be no sorting among workers into 
sectors. Thus the aggregate human capital takes the value 
     ( )1 .=j jH f E YR R R     (1) 
During the second period, some workers can be laid off. The ones who remain will be more 
productive by the factor τ so that 
   ( )( )*2 21= τ ≥j j jH f E Y Y yR R R R R ,     (2) 
where 1(•) is the indicator function. In the third period, some additional new workers can be 
hired from other sectors. 
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= τ ≥ + φ < ≤∑
J
js j js hjs h hs
h
H f E Y Y y E Y y Y yR R R R R R R R R R  
We allow firms to both dismiss workers ( )* *3 2if >js jy yR R  and hire new workers (if φℓhjs > 0). In 
our simulations below we did not have firms simultaneously doing both. 
Note that, in principle, a firm could fire a worker in period 4 that it hired in period 3 after 
learning about his ability. However, in practice this should happen only very rarely. The 
worker’s ability Yℓ was large enough so that in period 3 the worker was retained, and now we are 
cutting off the right-hand tail so the wage premium to them is even smaller. Thus, for 
computational reasons, we ignore this possibility and just assume that workers hired during 
period 3 will remain forever. Thus, for t > 3, all that changes is that the productivity of the new 
hires improves, 




= τ ≥ + φ τ < ≤∑
J
t js j js hjs h hs
h
H f E Y Y y E Y y Y yR R R R R R R R R R     (3) 
Once a worker is hired, she may be more productive than her market wage because τ > 1. 
We allow the firm to reap all of the benefits of this surplus by making a “take it or leave it” offer. 
However, we also assume that the labor market is competitive, with free entry into the market, so 
that the outside wage that a worker can receive is set so that the marginal profit on that worker is 
zero (in expectation). Inside wages are set by the firm to the worker’s reservation value. 
Thus, equilibrium can be characterized by the following four criteria: 
1) Outside wages are determined so that firms earn zero profit on average for a worker. 
 
2) Inside wages (after the first period a worker has worked for a firm) are chosen by the 
firm to make a worker indifferent between staying or leaving. 
 
3) Firms retain workers for whom it is profitable to do so.21 
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4) Workers make employment choices to maximize their expected present discounted 
value of earnings. 
 
It is easiest to solve this model by working backwards from period t > 4. Since nothing 
changes after period 4, all of these periods will look identical. Consider a firm j trying to poach 
an ℓ type worker from another firm. Let ΗyR  be the conditional expectation of the productivity of 
a worker of type ℓ who has experienced labor market history Η. During the second period, a 
worker who worked in sector j during period 1 and was retained will have history Η = j and 
( )*2 .= ≥j jy E Y Y yR R R R  During period 3 and beyond, after being hit by shock s, a worker who 
worked in sector j will have history Η = jsr where r is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
worker was retained. For example, one history Η may be that a worker started at firm j and were 
retained throughout; then, Η = js1 and ( )*1 3 .= ≥js jsy E Y Y yR R R R  Another potential history Η is that 
an individual was retained by a firm in sector j in period 2 but then laid off by that firm in period 
3. In that case, Η = js0 and ( )* *0 2 3 .= < ≤js j jsy E Y y Y yR R R R R  Then for any history Η, the expected 
marginal value of these types of workers to the new firm is 
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= ⎜ ⎟∂ −β⎝ ⎠














   (4) 
where β is the discount rate since Gj(Htj; s) doesn’t vary over time (after period 4). Since wages 
will be constant across time and since the wage will be the best outside opportunity, this yields 
that the outside wage during period 4 for an individual of type ℓ with labor market history Η is 













   (5) 
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for t ≥ 4. Since employers must keep the workers indifferent between leaving and staying, and 
because the outside wage does not change after period 4, employers will pay the constant outside 
wage wtℓΗ in all periods after period 4. 
Now consider period 3, in which there will be some turnover. We first consider the 
market for workers of type ℓ from a firm in sector h who are retained ( )*3 .> hsY yR R  If a firm in 
sector j considers hiring them, it will make expected profit 
  
( ) ( )3 3 4 4
1 3 1 1 4 1
3 41
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂β ⎜ ⎟− + τ −
⎜ ⎟∂ −β ∂⎝ ⎠
js js js js
hs hs hs hs
js js
G H G H
y w y w
H HR R R RR R
,  (6) 
where w3ℓhs1 is the outside wage for such a retained worker. Since the market is competitive 
between firms both within and between sectors, 
  
( ) ( )3 3 4 4
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…
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In determining the cutoff *3 jsy R , the firm has to be indifferent between releasing and 
retaining a worker with *3= jsY yR R . This yields that 
  ( ) ( )
3 1 4 1
* *
3 2
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Finally, consider a worker of type ℓ who was displaced ( )*3≤ hsY yR R  from firm h. He will 
be paid his best opportunity in the competitive market: 
 
( ) ( )443 3
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where the expression on the right hand-side comes from the zero profit constraint for each firm. 
For workers who are above the cutoffs during period 3, the firms that retain them will 
receive rents. Since these rents will be bid away by firms when hiring workers in earlier periods 
we will need to keep track of them. We define the expected rent as a function of a worker’s 
ability y as 
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j s js hs hs
s js js
G H G H
y y y y w y w
H H
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ ∂β⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟π = μ ≥ τ − + τ −
⎜ ⎟∂ −β ∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑R R R R
R R
 
Next consider period 2. In this case workers who are not retained leave this sector of the 
market. We write the production function in sector j for periods 1 and 2 as Fj. Using notation 
analogous to above, we let w2ℓh be the outside wage for workers who are retained in sector h. The 
equilibrium outside wage is defined so that expected marginal profit is zero 
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A firm chooses the cutoff value *2 hy R  so that it is just indifferent about retaining the 
worker. 
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Finally, during the first period, in equilibrium firms will offer wages so that the marginal 
profit is zero. 




= +β > τ − +β π ≥⎢ ⎥
∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
j j j j
j h j j j h
j j
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w E Y Y y y w E Y Y y
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 (8) 
Workers choose firms to maximize their expected present value of earnings. We assume that 
workers have no more information about their ability than do the firms. We do not explicitly give 
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the form for the present value of earnings, but all of the components of the wages have been 
defined. 
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by equations (1) – (8). 
 
5  RECONCILING MODEL WITH DATA 
Our goal in this section is to simulate the model and show that it can reconcile the data. 
Given the limited sample size of black workers in white-collar jobs, in this section we only 
attempt to explain the gender differences. 
We use a CES production function 













with the number of firm types (J) equal to five. We assume that individuals of different genders 
are different worker types, so we allow for 10 worker types—5 for each gender. In our model we 
allow for shocks to αtℓjs to occur between periods two and three. We will essentially model two 
different types of shocks to this economy. One type is a “sector-specific shock” in which αtℓjs 
falls for all values of ℓ in a given sector j. This can be thought of as a sector specific productivity 
shock, but could also be viewed as a demand shock to the sector. If the shock is large enough, the 
sector will disappear, which we view as analogous to a plant closing. We also consider a “human 
capital type shock” in which αtℓjs falls for all values of j for a given human capital type ℓ. We 
view this as “skill-biased” technological shock that affects the productivity of a particular skill 
type. An example of this type of shock is a technological discovery that is substitutable with type 
ℓ workers (such as the improvement of word processing software for typists). 
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Our data allow us to distinguish between these two types of shocks. To be in our layoff 
sample, an individual reported that the reason of job loss was either “slack work” or “position 
abolished.” We view these as mapping into our model well with the human capital type shock 
corresponding to position abolished while the firm shock relates to slack work. Intuitively in the 
model, if the shocks are of similar magnitude, a worker who is laid off through a human capital 
type shock will likely experience a much larger wage loss. The reason is simply that if the shocks 
occur at the sector level, a worker can move into a different sector that did not experience the 
shock. The worker’s wage still falls because her outside wage has fallen as a result of the shock. 
By contrast, a worker laid off because of a shock to her human capital can do no such thing. Her 
productivity, and analogously her wage, has fallen at all firms. 
In their paper, GK discuss the fact that a plant closing could be associated with poor local 
labor markets and thus could be associated with worse outcomes. This is related to our model if 
one interprets sectors j as local labor markets. 
We first informally look at this issue in the data by presenting tables analogous to Tables 
2A and 2B, but distinguishing a layoff between “slack work” and “position abolished.” These 
results are shown in Tables 5A and 5B. One can see that in every specification, the point 
estimates indicate that every group experiences a larger fall in wages for position abolished than 
for slack work. In the second to last row we present the p-value of a joint test as to whether the 
coefficients on slack work and position abolished are jointly the same. One can see that this 
hypothesis is strongly rejected for white-collar workers and is rejected in the specification of 
column (4) for blue-collar workers.22 Once again, one also sees the striking result that neither 
industry nor occupation is important in explaining these results. We believe these results in Table 
5 are of interest in their own right as (to our knowledge) they have not been previously discussed 
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in the literature on displaced worker effects. Although we do not show them explicitly, we also 
looked at slack work versus position abolished using the Weibull proportional hazard model. We 
find that for white-collar workers, position abolished leads to both economically and statistically 
significantly longer unemployment spells.23 
We now turn toward reconciling the model with the data. With this in mind we chose six 
moments in the data that we hope to match. By gender, we constructed the change in wages at 
displacement for three different types of displacement: plant closing, position abolished, and 
slack work. Since the model does not explicitly allow for an experience effect (although it would 
be very easy to add since it is presumably observable by everyone) we want to focus on the 
change that occurred between the last predisplacement wage and the first wage after 
displacement. Specifically we control for potential experience by including a proxy, which is 
defined as the number of years since displacement minus the total number of weeks unemployed 
during this period divided by 52, in the regression of change in log wage. We then obtain the 
predicted values for each of the 6 groups by fixing the potential experience at 0 years. 
The 6 moments we try to fit are presented in Table 6. One can see three key features of 
the data that we will show can be explained by the model. The difference in wage loss by gender 
for a plant closing is very small, and is in fact not statistically distinguishable. By contrast, for 
the two types of layoffs we see substantially larger losses for men than for women. The second 
key feature of the data that we plan to match is the difference between slack work and position 
abolished. We show that with heterogeneous human capital in the model it is straightforward to 
match this feature of the data. The third feature is that for both genders, the plant closing result is 
in between the other two. 
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There are essentially 10 different labor types—five basic types of each gender. A key 
aspect of the model is that different types of human capital are used differently in different firms. 
In particular we will assume that originally { }1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 .jα ∈R  For each firm and for each 
gender, α will take on each of these five numbers. Furthermore, the model is completely 
symmetric so for each labor type ℓ, the share parameter α takes on each of the 5 values for some 
firm type.24 
A key piece of this thought exercise is that we restrict the model in another important 
way by assuming that the gender productivity does not interact with sector at all because the 
results in Table 2A suggest that industry and occupation differences between men and women do 
not play a crucial role in explaining the results. For this reason we restrict the model so the 
“industry/occupation” composition is the same for men and women. Formally, let ℓ = {1, …, 5} 
denote men and ℓ = 16, …, 10} denote women. We impose that for all states of the world s, 
    ( )5 for 5 .t js t js−α = α >R R R  
Thus, shocks hit men and women in exactly the same way. So, for example, a human 
capital type shock that hits skill group ℓ = 3 for men will also hit group ℓ = 8 for women. This 
means that in the end we have three data moments that differ by gender, but in the simulation we 
only have either a 2 or 1 parameter that differs by gender. Thus even though there are many 
parameters in the model, we are certainly not guaranteed to be able to fit the data. 
We simulate three different changes in α between periods 2 and 3: 
1) modest proportional change in αjℓ by j (slack work), 
2) large change in αjℓ by j causing sector to disappear (plant closing), and 
3) proportional change in αjℓ by ℓ (position abolished). 
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In particular, we will assume that there are 16 states of the world in period 3 (S = 16). 
With probability 0.85, no shock is experienced. Then we put 1 percent probability on each of the 
other 15. These other 15 correspond to 5 of each type of the shock above. That is because we 
have 5 sectors, each sector has a 1 percent probability of getting hit by a modest proportional 
change in αjℓ and also a 1 percent probability of getting hit by a large change in αjℓ which causes 
it to shut down. For each gender, we also have 5 labor types and each has a 1 percent probability 
of getting hit by a proportional change in αjℓ. 
The model has many different margins to complicate it. To ease the computational 
burden, we restrict turnover in a few ways. First, as mentioned above in Section 4, we do not 
allow firms to fire workers after period 3. Second, for the sector-specific shock we only allow for 
layoffs in the sectors which experienced the shocks. In principle, since the outside option has 
changed, there could be some layoffs for other firms as well. However, this should be small, not 
of primary interest in this analysis, and incorporating it would make the model substantially 
more difficult to solve. 
We assume that the ability of a worker i of type ℓ can be written as 
    ( )log i i iY = θ + υR R R   , 
where θℓi is observable to an outside firm and νℓi is orthogonal to information about the quality of 
a worker. Further, we assume that   where iϑ  is the gender of individual 
i. Allowing the information to vary by gender is important in fitting the data. While we have no 
clear explanation as to why 2ϑσ  would vary across gender, we discuss it more below. Since 
wages will be proportional to observable ability, heterogeneity in θℓi across individuals plays no 
( )20, ,ϑν σ∼ ii NR
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crucial role in the model so we just fix θℓi = 0 for everyone. Modifying this assumption would 
make no difference to any of the results we show.25 
This leaves us with essentially four types of parameters: 1) the elasticity of substitution 
(ρ), 2) the training cost (τ), 3) the standard deviation of the unknown component of ability (σg), 
and 4) the size of the shocks. As a practical matter, we found that when a plant closes, the only 
parameter that matters substantially for the simulated results is the elasticity of substitution. 
Furthermore, in practice, the wage loss with plant closing in the simulations will be very close 
across gender, and the difference in the data is not statistically significant. Thus, we do not try to 
match this difference exactly, but rather choose a value of ρ that matches approximately.26 This 
process led to the value ρ = 0.85. We then numerically solved for values of the other parameters 
to match the four data points. While we have a number of different parameters, only τ and σg 
vary by gender. Thus, again we should highlight that our goal is to show that the model can 
reconcile with the data (which it is certainly not guaranteed to). Another value of this exercise is 
that the reader can see the types of parameter values that are needed to fit the results and can 
judge whether they seem “plausible” or not. 
The results of this simulation are presented in Table 6. One can see that we do fit the four 
moments that we are trying to fit. The parameters that lead to this fit are shown in the bottom 
panel of Table 6. As one can see, one result is that the standard deviation of unobserved ability is 
substantially higher for men than it is for women. In the simulation, this leads the “lemon effect” 
to be larger for men than for women. It essentially embodies the idea that a layoff is a stronger 
signal for men than it is for women. It is important that the reader not take this parameter too 
literally. Another interpretation of the phenomena is that the decision to lay off an individual is 
more complicated than in the model and involves other factors beyond just pure ability such as 
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the value of home production which could change the threshold.27 If it were the case that the 
decision to lay off a man was based purely on his market ability, but the decision to lay off a 
woman depended on both market ability and the value of nonmarket time, then the signal for a 
man would be stronger than the signal for a woman. We don’t view this as a fundamentally 
different model than the one we have written down, but rather as a potential reason why layoff is 
a more informative signal for men than it is for women (which is the essence of the higher value 
of σg in the results). 
A second feature of the results is that the value of τ is quite high. Note that in the model, 
this will not reflect into a higher measured return to tenure in a log wage regression because the 
firm pays the outside wage. The fact that τ is quite high is essentially necessary if asymmetric 
information is important. Since a firm pays workers with identical observable characteristics the 
same as their outside market, the firm has a strong incentive to fire the workers with the worst 
unobservable attributes. If a majority of workers are retained, it must be that these worst workers 
are relatively more productive for the current firm than for the outside labor market. Thus, it 
must be the case that some combination of hiring costs, training costs, or specific human capital 
are important. Any of these can be interpreted as τ. One may feel uncomfortable about why τ 
should vary with gender. We relax that restriction below. Even given the current parameters in 
which τ is larger for men, one can see that the retention probability in the second period is much 
higher for women than for men. This is due to the differences in τg. 
We simulate the effects of three types of shocks. With a plant closing, one sector 
disappears and all workers leave for another sector. For the sector shock, sector j* is hit by a 
shock of 0.948. Formally this means that 
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We see that this leads 20 percent of men (and 16 percent of women) who were employed in this 
sector to be laid off. 
Similarly, for the human capital type shock the effect is 0.943. If type ℓ* ≤ 5 is hit by the 
shock this means that 
   3 2
otherwise
2
{0.943 * or * 5 .
α




R R R  
Since this is a negative shock to all sectors, the layoff probabilities are much lower—less than 1 
percent for both men and women. Also note that while the size of the shocks is virtually identical 
between the two cases, the wage penalty is substantially larger for position abolished than for 
slack work. This is a more general feature that comes out of the model rather than being an 
artifact of the particular normalization. When a sector is hit by a shock, other sectors are not. 
Therefore, a worker can move to a sector that was not hit. However, this is not possible for a 
human capital shock as the worker’s productivity has declined everywhere. 
We were uncomfortable with the result that the value of τ would differ by gender. We 
were not able to perfectly match all of the moments when we imposed the condition that τ does 
not vary across gender. Instead we performed the following exercise. We took all of the 
parameters from the previous simulation as given. However, we restricted τ = 1:5 for each 
gender that was in between the estimates in the previous model. We then simulate the model 
again and present it in Table 7. One can see that the numbers between the data and the simulation 
are no longer identical but are quite close. Most importantly, we tested whether these simulated 
moments could be rejected in the data and did not reject. One thing that changes is that the initial 
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retention probability for men falls substantially as one would expect. However, the wage losses 
change little. 
We have shown in this section that our model is consistent with the data. Since the model 
is highly parameterized there might be a question of whether the fact that we can reconcile the 
data is particularly surprising or interesting. On this point we make three main comments. First, 
an important finding in the empirical section is that occupation and industry play little roles in 
explaining the gender difference in plant closings and layoffs. Thus we do not allow this to 
reconcile the difference. Second, asymmetric information plays the key role in explaining the 
gender gap. Specifically, in Table 7 it is only σg that can explain the difference between men and 
women. The result in the model is reconciled by the fact that wage losses at both types of layoff 
(but not plant closing) differ substantially by gender. The basic idea is that for some reason being 
laid off is a relatively more important signal for a man than for a woman. We do not have a 
strong ex-ante reason to explain why this would be the case. The point estimates of the model 
would suggest that the standard deviation of unobserved ability (to the outside firm) is larger for 
men than for women. Of course, one does not necessarily want to take this literally. The 
difference could be standing in for some other feature of the data; for example, the layoff 
decision is more complicated for women than for men, so that unobserved ability is a relatively 
more important factor. Third, heterogeneous human capital is crucial to explain the results. For 
both genders we see the largest wage losses at position abolished, second at plant closing, and 
third at slack work. Heterogeneous human capital is crucial for reconciling this result. Without it, 
one would expect, as in GK, that the wage loss at layoff (of both types) would be larger than the 
wage loss at plant closing. 
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6  CONCLUSIONS 
In a seminal paper, Gibbons and Katz (1991) develop and empirically test a model of 
asymmetric information in the labor market. They derive an implication of their model that if 
asymmetric information is important, one should expect a larger fall in earnings at layoff than at 
plant closing. Using the Displaced Worker Survey, they show this implication to be true for men. 
We revisit this question, making use of the many more years of data that are available now. We 
test the hypothesis on four different demographic groups. For three of our four groups (black 
men, black women, and white women) we find the opposite of the Gibbons and Katz prediction; 
plant closings lead to more negative consequences than do layoffs. We show that this difference 
occurs for two reasons. First, white men experience larger earnings declines at layoff than the 
other groups. Second, black workers experience substantially larger decreases in their earnings at 
plant closing than do whites. 
We document four other aspects of the data. First, the basic results are remarkably robust 
to occupation and industry controls. Second, following Oyer and Schaefer (2000), we make use 
of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA91) to test an implication of the model. We 
show that black workers experience a relatively larger loss in earnings at layoffs after 1991 than 
before, which is consistent with asymmetric information. We think this is the strongest evidence 
in favor of asymmetric information. Third, we demonstrate similar patterns when we look at the 
length of unemployment spells following displacement. Fourth, we document for the first time in 
the literature that the two types of layoffs reported in the DWS data have very different features 
in terms of earnings losses. In particular, we find that earnings falls are greater when layoff is 
associated with “position abolished” then when it is associated with “slack work.” Furthermore, 
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wage losses from plant closings fall between these two types of layoffs in terms of their 
magnitude. 
We develop a model that incorporates heterogeneous human capital into an asymmetric 
information framework based on GK. The model includes different types of firms and different 
types of workers. In the model, once a worker has worked for a firm for a period, the current firm 
knows his/her skill level but outside firms do not. We model layoffs and plant closings as 
resulting when shocks hit firms in which the workers work. We then numerically simulate the 
model and show that one can find parameters of the model to make it consistent with the data. 
We simulate the model and show that it captures the key features of the data. In 
particular, asymmetric information plays the key role in explaining the gender gap in the 
model—this result is reconciled with the fact that in the data wage losses at both types of layoff 
(but not plant closing) differ substantially by gender. The basic idea is that for some reason being 
laid off is a relatively more important signal for a man than for a woman. The point estimates of 
the model would suggest that the standard deviation of unobserved ability (to the outside firm) is 
larger for men than for women. As we cautioned earlier, however, one does not necessarily want 
to take this literally. It could be standing in for some other feature of the data such as the layoff 
decision is more complicated for women than for men so that unobserved ability is a relatively 
more important factor. One interesting extension can be to extend the model to allow for layoff 
decisions to depend on both market ability and the value of nonmarket time, which in general 
can differ by gender, and then investigate the mechanisms directly. 
Another extension of the analysis would be to incorporate heterogeneity of taste 
discrimination across firms in the model to explain the fact that blacks suffer greater wage 
penalties from plant closings than whites. 
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Both of these extensions are very interesting and important. More generally, our model is 
overly simple in many dimensions. However, sorting out these alternatives requires more data 
than we get in the DWS, where we essentially just have the six numbers in Tables 6 and 7. Other 
useful data sets are available and we leave this work for future research. 
Gibbons and Katz acknowledge at the end of their paper that, “Unfortunately, the nature 
of asymmetric information seems to imply that direct empirical tests of its importance are not 
possible, so indirect tests of the kind presented here may be all that is possible.” We share the 
sentiment and agree that our data are not rich enough to precisely distinguish between all 
potential explanations. However, we think we have provided additional evidence to bear on these 
issues, and our results suggest that explanations of asymmetric information and heterogeneous 
human capital are important. We hope that alternative data sources can be found that will shed 
more light on these important issues in the future research. 
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Table 1A: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(White Collar) 
Descriptive Statistics: Sample Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses 

















































































































































































No. obs. 1,670 2,17092 91 1,741 1,841 162 165 
 
Sample selections: (1) White-collar workers aged 20–64; (2) lost job for three reasons: plant closing, position 
abolished, or slack work; (3) lost a job in previous three years; (4) reemployed at survey date; (5) full-time to full-
time transition; (6) private sector to private sector; (7) delete if reemployment weekly wage < $40; (8) delete 
agriculture and construction. 
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Table 1B: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(Blue Collar) 
Descriptive Statistics: Sample Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses 


















































































































































































No. obs. 2,1082,515 206 201 763 682 142 110 
 
Sample selections: (1) Blue-collar workers aged 20–64; (2) lost job for three reasons: plant closing, position 
abolished, or slack work; (3) lost a job in previous three years; (4) reemployed at survey date; (5) full-time to full-
time transition; (6) private sector to private sector; (7) delete if reemployment weekly wage < $40; (8) delete 
agriculture and construction. 
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Table 2A: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(White Collar) 
Dependent variable: Change in log wage 











































Y Y Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education -- Y Y Y 
Yr. dummies, Yrs. since disp, Region -- Y Y Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+, omitted < 1) -- Y Y Y 
Industry -- -- Y Y 
Occupation -- -- -- Y 
N 6,981 6,981 6,978 6,978 




Table 2B: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(Blue Collar) 
Dependent variable: Change in log wage 











































Y Y Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education -- Y Y Y 
Yr. dummies, Yrs. since disp, Region -- Y Y Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+, omitted < 1) -- Y Y Y 
Industry -- -- Y Y 
Occupation -- -- -- Y 
N 5,926 5,926 5,885 5,875 




Table 3: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(White Collar Only) 
Dependent variable: Change in log wage 
 (1) (2) 















































Married, Age, Age2, Education -- Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+, omitted < 1) -- Y 
Yrs. since disp., Yr. dummies, Regions -- Y 
Industry, Occupation -- Y 
N 6,981 6,978 




Table 4: Displaced Worker Surveys 1986–2002 
Effects on Duration of the First Spell of Joblessness since Displacement 
Dependent Variable: Log (Weeks of Joblessness) 
MLE Estimates from Weibull Duration Model 
  White   Blue Collar  





























































Married, Age, Age2 -- Y Y -- Y Y 
Education -- Y Y -- Y Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–
10, 10+, omitted < 1) 
-- Y Y -- Y Y 
Yr. dummies, Yrs. since disp, Regions -- Y Y -- Y Y 
Industry, Occupation -- Y Y -- Y Y 
Log Predisplacement wage -- -- -0.018 
(0.029) 
-- -- -0.014 
(0.037) 












N 7,325 7,306 6,539 6,314 6,193 5,656 
 
Sample selections: (1) workers aged 20–64; (2) lost job for three reasons: plant closing, position abolished, or slack 
work; (3) lost a job in previous three years; (4) displaced from full-time jobs; (5) displaced from private sector jobs; 
(6) delete if predisplacement weekly wage < $40; (7) not displaced from agriculture and construction. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5A: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(White Collar) 
Dependent variable: Change in log wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






























































Y Y Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education -- Y Y Y 
Yr. dummies, Yrs. since disp, Region -- Y Y Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+, omitted < 1) -- Y Y Y 
Industry -- -- Y Y 
Occupation  -- -- Y Y 
P-value for the F-test (null hypothesis: the coefficients on 
slack work and position abolished are jointly equal) 
0.0000 0.0027 0.0062 0.0016 
N 6,981 6,981 6,978 6,978 




Table 5B: Displaced Worker Surveys 1984–2002 
(Blue Collar) 
Dependent variable: Change in log wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






























































Y Y Y 
Married, Age, Age2, Education -- Y Y Y 
Yr. dummies, Yrs. since disp, Region -- Y Y Y 
Predisplacement tenure (1–3, 3–5, 5–10, 10+, omitted < 1) -- Y Y Y 
Industry -- -- Y Y 
Occupation -- -- Y Y 
P-value for the F-test (null hypothesis: the coefficients on 
slack work and position) 
0.1266 0.3632 0.1623 0.0436 
N 5,926 5,926 5,875 5,875 




Results for Model 1 
Simulated Log Wage Differentials 
 Male Female 
 Data Simulation Data Simulation 















Parameters of Simulated Model 
 Male Female 
ρ 0.85 
τ 1.990 1.372 
σ 0.097 0.018 
Initial retention probability 0.710 0.999 
Sector Shock 
Shock 0.948 
Layoff probability 0.202 0.161 
Human Capital Type Shock 
Shock 0.943 




Results for Model 2 
Simulated Log Wage Differentials 
 Male Female 
 Data Simulation Data Simulation 















Parameters of Simulated Model 
 Male Female 
ρ 0.85 
τ 1.500 1.500 
σ 0.097 0.018 
Initial retention probability 0.366 0.999 
Sector Shock 
Shock 0.948 
Layoff probability 0.076 0.119 
Human Capital Type Shock 
Shock 0.943 





1.  They use white-collar workers because they argue that blue-collar jobs are much more likely 
to be covered by collective bargaining agreements.  In that case seniority is typically the main 
determinant of the layoff decisions so that a layoff will not necessarily convey negative 
information.  
 
2.  The theory of statistical discrimination was introduced by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) 
and subsequently developed by, among others, Aigner and Cain (1977), Lundberg and Startz 
(1983), and Coate and Loury (1993). Empirical studies of statistical discrimination are still 
scarce. A notable exception is Altonji and Pierret (2001). Altonji and Blank (1999) present a 
survey on this topic. 
 
3.  Gibbons and Katz also informally make the point that if plant closing occurs in worse labor 
markets then we might see bigger drops in wages.  This is related to our concept of 
heterogeneous human capita. 
 
4.  The DWS ask and collect information on, at most, one job loss for each individual.  If the 
respondent lost more than one job in the reference period, she/he is asked about information only 
for the longest job lost. 
 
5.  In 1994 and later DWS, individuals who report a job loss for the reasons other than the first 
three are not asked follow-up questions about the lost job. 
 
6.  We restrict to the sample to full-time jobs (at least 35 hours per week) because the DWS only 
provided information on usual weekly earnings (and not hourly earnings) and the full- or part-
time status of the worker’s old job.  By limiting our sample to full-time workers we attempt to 
control for hours of work on the old job. 
 
7.  Using data from the NLSY, Krashinsky (2002) also finds that workers displaced by layoffs 
suffer larger wage losses than those displaced by plant clostings.  However, he provides an 
alternative explanation attributing the effect to differences in firm size of predisplacement 
employers.  He argues that small firms are more likely to close down when facing adverse 
economic shocks, while larger firms are more likely to reduce their workforces.  Therefore, laid-
off workers tend to lose any wage premium or rents they earned from working at large firms.  
Using data from the PSID, Stevens (1997) also finds that wage losses following layoffs are larger 
than those following plant closings, but she argues that that can be explained by the larger wage 
reductions prior to displacement for plant closings than for layoffs.  Song (2007) reexamines the 
Gibbons-Katz study and argues that their findings can be partly attributed to differential recall 
bias for layoffs versus plant closings in the 1984 and 1986 DWS and, in later years, mostly by 
higher wage-tenure profile prior to displacement for layoffs than for plant closings. 
 
8.  The t-stat for black men is 1.93, which falls barely below the 5 percent convention but is well 




9.  We do this to increase the precision of the results. 
 
10.  While previous federal employment discrimination legislation typically limited plaintiff 
recovery to lost wages, CRA91 allows employees to sue for intentional gender and race 
discrimination up to $300,000 in punitive damages; furthermore, CRA91 allows employees to 
claim unlawful termination on the basis of race to sue for unlimited punitive damages.  (See 
Oyer and Schaefer [2000] for more details of the law.) 
 
11.  The data used in Oyer and Shaefer (2000) can not separately identify job losses due to plant 
closing from the other forms of layoffs (selective downsizings such as abolished positions). 
 
12.  There might be other reasons for worrying about changes over time in general.  It is widely 
believed that there has been an increase in the number of layoffs, especially from white-collar 
jobs in some large corporations, in the early to mid-1990s.  Findings in Farber (1997, 2003) lead 
support to this belief.  He finds that although the overall involuntary job loss rate did not change 
substantially from the 1980s to 1990s, there was a decade-long increase in the rate of job loss 
due to position abolished.  If mass layoffs occur increasingly frequently, then the event layoff 
might become less informative about individual worker’s productivity.  Therefore we would 
expect the difference in wage losses between layoffs and plant closings to become smaller over 
time. 
 
13.  Each DWS has a question about weeks unemployed since job loss.  In 1984 and 1986, it is 
total weeks of joblessness since displacement.  In 1986, there was also information on the 
number of jobs held since displacement.  These two variables allow us to determine the length of 
the initial spell of joblessness for those employed in their first job at the survey date.  Since 1988, 
the question directly asks about weeks unemployed until found a job, i.e., the initial spell length.  
(Due to a survey error, this variable was missing for most observations in 1994.)  Workers who 
had not worked since displacement are always included in the sample just with censored length 
of the initial spell.  We then construct a sample of first spells of joblessness from various years 
subject to the following additional restrictions: workers aged 20–64 who were displaced in 
previous three years from full-time, private sector jobs not in agriculture and construction 
industries and had weekly wage no less than $40. 
 
14.  While including the wage at displacement is similar, one still finds lower labor supply by 
race and gender conditional on wages.  So while this might help, it does not completely account 
for the differences. 
 
15.  The fact that we don’t see much of a plant closing effect for black workers in the blue-collar 
data adds to the puzzle.  Of course, this can be consistent with the taste discrimination theory if 
there is much greater prejudice against minorities in white-collar jobs than in blue-collar jobs. 
 
16.  We model each sector as being composed of a large number of smaller firms.  With constant 
returns to scale, we can focus on the aggregate human capital production function, and each of 
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the smaller firms will look identical.  It is also easier to think about what an entering firm would 
do.  With increasing or decreasing returns, this would be much more complicated. 
 
17.  The reason is that all workers have the same outside market, firms would have an incentive 
to fire the worst worker and thus eventually fire all workers.  With τ > 1, workers have more 
value in the current firm than in outside firms so that some workers will be retained. 
 
18.  Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue similarly that their analogue could represent firm specific 
human capital, mobility costs of the worker, hiring cost of the new employer, or a firing cost 
from the old employer. 
 
19.  One could make some assumptions to guarantee that this condition holds.  Alternatively, one 
could analyze all of the equilibria.  However, our goal is to show that the model is consistent 
with the data, rather than to try to distinguish between equilibria.  We strongly suspect that more 
than one equilibrium can reconcile the data. 
 
20.  Of course, it is still true that firms typically do not lay off all workers—they choose the ones 
of lower ability.  Thus one sees a lemon effect for both types of layoffs. 
 
21.  Given the assumptions we have made, one will only lay off the worst workers because the 
outside market is identical for all workers.  Thus there will always be a “lemon” effect. 
 
22.  When both heterogeneous human capital and asymmetric information are at work, we would 
see differences between white collars and blue collars in the relative wage losses for layoffs and 
plant closings.  The fact that we see similar patterns between white collars and blue collars in the 
relative wage losses for position abolished and slack work suggests that the human capital story 
applies to both in the similar way.  Thus, for the human capital story we think the blue-collar 
data is supportive (although somewhat weaker). 
 
23.  The point estimate for blue-collar workers actually goes the other direction, but the 
difference is not close to statistically significant.  The p-value for the test that the coefficients on 
slack work and position abolished are the same in the specification similar to column (4) of 
Table 5 is 0.0082 for white-collar workers and 0.5733 for blue-collar workers. 
 
24.  Making it symmetric substantially lowers the computational cost because of similarities in 
behavior across groups.  Without this the model would be much harder to estimate. 
 
25.  The only place where this is somewhat relevant is in determining the outside wage for 
individuals who are laid off after the first period.  Here we assume that the outside wage is 0.5.  
This only matters in determining the first period wage which plays no role in our analysis. 
 
26.  Here we just iterated trying alternative values of ρ until we found a value that gave 
simulated values of wage loss in between the gender specific values (i.e., simulated values in the 




27.  This would involve a more complicated model in which home production was the relevant 
outside option for some.  Individuals with higher value of home production could require more 
compensation and be laid off earlier. 
